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When the newly inaugurated Sultan of Ternate Kaicili Sibori, made a 
royal visit to North Sulawesi in the dry season of 1675, he was received 
with great ceremony by his local vassals. In Manado, delegations from 
the mountain villages of what is now Minahasa brought tribute gifts of 
rice and meat for the sultan, inquiring whether he had any instructions 
for them. On the nearby island of Tagulandang, where the local chiefs 
greeted him with the sembah and kissed his feet, Sibori was told that a 
headhunting expedition had been launched to mark the death of his father 
and predecessor. At Tabukan on Greater Sangir, where he was to marry a 
local princess, the sultan was given a spectacular welcome by “a great 
number of men and women, drumming and singing to have seen their 
lord in person.” When he asked each of the Sangirese raja for 100 men to 
take back with him to Ternate “in order to enlarge and people his 
kingdom,” they agreed without complaint.1 
 Yet by the end of 1677, little more than two years after this visit, the 
rulers of Tagulandang and Sangir had all signed treaties repudiating Ter-
naten rule and declaring themselves vassals of the Dutch East India 
Company.2 In the text of his particular contract with the VOC, the raja of 
Tabukan declared that he had “never maintained more than a close 
friendship with the Ternaten kings,” even if at times, “making a virtue of 
necessity,” he had been forced to behave as if he were their loyal vassal.3 
In 1679, the Minahasans who had honored Sibori at Manado in 1675 also 
placed themselves under direct Company rule.4 
 These events were historic in that they heralded a definitive end to 
Ternaten political influence in North Sulawesi. By 1681 the whole of the 
                                                      
1VOC 1310: 457, 458, 461, 468–469. 
2Heeres & Stapel 1907–1955 III: 83–90, 105–110. 
3Van der Aa 1867: 332. 
4Godée Molsbergen 1928: 50–58. 
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peninsula from Gorontalo eastwards, as well as the Sangir archipelago, 
would have passed—permanently, as it turned out—under Dutch control. 
In itself, however, the kind of political about-face just described was un-
exceptional in seventeenth century North Sulawesi. Sudden switches of 
allegiance from one external patron to another had long been common 
practice among the local polities in the region. As a result, Ternaten 
dominance there had never been more than patchy and intermittent. 
 Politics in precolonial North Sulawesi tended to be fluid, violent, per-
sonal, and pragmatic. The events following the Ternaten royal visit of 
1675 were typical in all these respects. By 1677, Kaicili Sibori had made 
himself unpopular in the region by rejecting his new Tabukan wife, by 
killing a Sangirese ruler whom he suspected of disloyalty, and by allow-
ing his Malukan subjects to attack and plunder supposedly friendly 
coastal settlements on the North Sulawesi peninsula.5 Under these cir-
cumstances, many of his vassals were glad to accept the alternative of 
Company rule when it was offered to them. Shortly before they did so, in 
fact, several Sangirese chiefs had already attempted to escape from 
Ternaten control by placing themselves under Spanish protection.6 
 Similar dynamics had operated time and again in the course of the 
seventeenth century, working alternately against Ternate and in its favor. 
The case of Manado is illustrative. In 1614 the raja of Manado—whose 
successors would be known in colonial times as the kings of Bolaang-
Mongondow—appealed to the Spanish in Maluku for protection against 
the Ternatens, whom he accused of plundering his subjects’ women and 
property.7 Once established in Manado, however, the Spaniards in turn 
came into conflict with the raja, ultimately burning his capital and forc-
ing him to flee southward along the coast. His response was to place 
himself once more under the protection of Ternate, which, with Dutch 
help, launched an expedition to expel the Spaniards from the area in 
1644.8 In 1660 Ternate was still aiding Manado in punitive action against 
Minahasan groups who sheltered occasional Spanish expeditions.9 In 
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7Correspondencia 1868: 223. 
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1681 the Manadonese raja was described as “completely dependent” 
upon his Ternaten master.10 
 The reasons for the patchiness and instability of Ternaten control in 
North Sulawesi can be summarized in one word: competition. The 
westward expansion of Ternate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
coincided with European—first Portuguese, later Spanish and Dutch—
incursions into Sulawesi, and also with the rise and fall of the indigenous 
kingdom of Makassar in the south of the same island. North Sulawesi, 
then, was a periphery contested by a number of powerful centers. This 
dangerous situation was exacerbated by local competition between the 
many small polities within the region itself, who regularly attempted to 
involve external powers in their own mutual conflicts. Amid the resulting 
flux, Ternate was unable to establish a stable relationship with any of its 
supposed vassals in North Sulawesi. The following sections briefly 
examine how the problem of competition manifested itself in three areas 
of the Ternate–North Sulawesi relationship: military, economic, and 
cultural. 
The Military Contest 
According to the earliest dated evidence for Ternaten expansion in North 
Sulawesi, Sultan Hairun prepared a war fleet in 1563 to force Islam upon 
groups there that had petitioned the Portuguese in Ternate to baptize 
them as Christians.11 If this Jesuit missionary report can be believed, 
then, the process began with violence or the threat of violence, and in 
competition with a rival power in Maluku. Both violence and compe-
tition are certainly confirmed as aspects of the expansion by later 
sources. Perhaps the most striking examples concern the kingdom of 
Siau, on the island of the same name in the Sangir archipelago. 
 Within three years of the establishment of a Portuguese Jesuit mission 
post on Siau in 1584, the island had been attacked and pillaged by 
Ternate.12 In 1593 the raja of Siau responded to the Ternaten menace by 
sailing to Manila and swearing fealty to the king of Spain, receiving in 
return the protection of a small Spanish garrison.13 In 1605 the newly 
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formed VOC drove the Portuguese out of Maluku, and in the following 
year the Spanish, alarmed at this Dutch success, sent a strong force from 
the Philippines and established their own fort on Ternate island not far 
from that of the Company. Siau now became a regular staging post on 
the Spanish supply route to Maluku, and as such a military target not 
only for Ternate, but also for the Dutch, with whom the Ternatens con-
cluded a formal alliance in 1607. 
 In 1612 Ternate and the VOC raided several Siau villages in a joint 
expedition, and in 1614 they returned to conquer the island outright.14 In 
1615 the Company made a notorious attempt to ship the whole popu-
lation to Banda as forced labor for the Dutch nutmeg plantations there, 
but within a few years the kingdom was reestablished and came once 
more under Spanish control.15 During the Dutch attempt to “extirpate” 
all clove trees from North Maluku after 1652, the spice continued to be 
grown on Spanish Siau. In 1677 the VOC restored its clove monopoly 
and Ternate settled its century-old score with Siau when a joint Ter-
naten–Dutch expedition conquered the island for the second and last 
time, driving the Spanish permanently from North Sulawesi.16 Fearful of 
further Ternaten retribution, the captive Siau king then pleaded to be-
come a Company vassal, to which Kaicili Sibori, satisfied with his re-
venge and under pressure from the Company, had already agreed.17 
 Siau, Manado, and Minahasa were not the only targets of Ternaten 
coercion in North Sulawesi. A list of subject territories of Ternate repro-
duced in Argensola’s Conquista de las Islas Malucas, and probably 
dating from 1591, already includes the whole of the peninsula from Toli-
toli and Tomini eastward, plus Sangir.18 Each locality on the list is ac-
companied by an estimate of the number of fighting men at its disposal. 
Argensola describes the Ternaten state system at one point as a tyranni-
cal empire, and elsewhere as an “alliance” in the sense of a protection 
racket in which the “protection” is mainly against the allies themselves: 
“who in these islands is obedient to Maluku, is spared the rabid depre-
                                                      
14Van Dijk 1862: 216–217; Tiele 1877–1886 VIII: 271, 293; Wessels 1935: 
100–102. 
15Tiele & Heeres 1886–1895 I: 132–163; Wessels 1935: 103–106. 
16Van der Aa 1867. 
17Van der Aa 1867: 188, 209. 
18Argensola 1609: 82; Jacobs 1974–1984 II: 304. 
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dations of the league.”19 The military character of Ternaten power in 
North Sulawesi is confirmed by a Dutch document from 1627 in which it 
is noted that Limboto, one of the most important local powers on the 
peninsula, paid its tribute not directly to the sultan of Ternate but to his 
kapita laut or naval commander Kaicili Ali, in the manner of a military 
fiefdom.20 
 The risks involved in defying Ternate grew all the more formidable 
once the VOC added its ships, guns, and trained soldiers to the korakora 
fleets and warrior bands of the sultan and his retainers. When part of 
Sangir “deserted” to Siau and the Spanish in 1624, a Ternaten–Dutch 
punitive expedition came close to capturing some 5,000 Sangirese pris-
oners before the accidental loss of its supply ship forced it to withdraw.21 
A similar expedition against Gorontalo in 1647 succeeded in taking the 
enemy stronghold and killed, according to a Dutch report, as many as 
4,000 local people.22 These early expeditions, however, remained 
Ternaten rather than Dutch initiatives. The VOC agreed to participate in 
the Sangir campaign only with the greatest reluctance, while the 
governor who approved Dutch involvement in the Gorontalo expedition 
was officially reprimanded by his superiors in Batavia. Even when the 
Company began to dominate its Ternaten ally later in the century, Dutch 
military action never became a necessary condition for alliance success 
in North Sulawesi. The conquest of Siau in 1677, although masterminded 
by the VOC, was actually achieved entirely by the Ternatens and their 
local vassals without a shot being fired by the accompanying Dutch 
forces.23 
 That Ternate could rely upon local as well as Dutch military help in 
such a campaign may seem a paradox after what has been said about the 
violent nature of Ternaten expansion in North Sulawesi. Yet the active 
participation of local vassals was a recurrent feature of the whole expan-
sion process. When Ternate first attacked Siau in 1587, for instance, it 
was already supported by Siau’s neighbor Tagulandang, which also aided 
the Ternaten–Dutch expedition against Siau in 1612.24 This reflects the 
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second type of competition, after that between external powers like 
Ternate and the Spanish, which helped determine the course of North 
Sulawesi’s political history in this period: local struggles between 
indigenous groups and leaders. 
 The political geography of precolonial North Sulawesi, like its cul-
tural geography, was complex and fragmented.25 Two loose political 
systems could be discerned, one oriented toward the Gulf of Tomini and 
another covering the north coast and the Sangir archipelago. The former 
was dominated by the kingdoms of Gorontalo and Limboto, while the 
latter comprised a chain of smaller centers, each with its own datu or raja 
and its own local hinterland, extending along the outer or northern coast 
and the Sangir islands from Kaili to the southern tip of Mindanao. The 
leading families within each system were extensively intermarried, but 
neither network was ever consolidated into a single polity. In some inte-
rior parts of the peninsula, notably in Minahasa, lived tribal groups only 
loosely associated with the coastal raja. 
 A certain level of conflict among all these power centers was normal 
and endemic. In 1569, a Portuguese Jesuit described North Sulawesi as a 
“restless” area and attributed this to its division between “so many 
kings.”26 Seventeenth century observers wrote that the Sangirese were 
“habitually at odds with one another” and described Minahasa as a land 
of “parties, conflicts and feuds.”27 Such “restlessness” was necessitated, 
in fact, by the traditional practice of headhunting. When Talaud islanders 
told a Dutch official in 1825 that without war they could “enjoy no good 
fortune,” they were stating a cultural truth which, two centuries earlier, 
had been valid for most of the region.28 Human heads were required, and 
sought among neighboring groups, for a wide variety of ritual occasions, 
including funerals and other individual rites of passage, inaugurations of 
new settlements and structures, and propitiation ceremonies at times of 
sickness and poor harvests.29 In these circumstances, the existence of 
kinship links between adjacent groups served less to ensure peace 
between them than to lend added bitterness to their inevitable conflicts. 
                                                      
25Henley 1992: 44–56. 
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28Van Delden 1844 II: 27. 
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 When Ternate or a European power offered to support one party in 
such a conflict in return for obedience and tribute, the temptation to ac-
cept was usually irresistable. Typically, the other party would then re-
spond by seeking out a rival patron. In this way, patterns of dependency 
developed that reflected local animosities as much as imperial interests. 
In the Sangir archipelago, for instance, it was no accident that Tagu-
landang emerged as a staunch Ternaten vassal as soon as its nearest 
neighbor, Siau, fell under Spanish control. On Greater Sangir, a more 
intermittent European presence and a political geography fragmented 
even by North Sulawesi standards produced a kaleidoscope of changing 
allegiances, featuring flirtations with Makassar and even Tidore, a power 
rarely active west of Maluku.30 In Minahasa, the long struggle between 
Spain and the Dutch–Ternaten alliance was intimately associated with 
hostilities among the Minahasan walak, or tribal communities, and with 
tensions between the tribesmen and the Manado raja.31 Further west, a 
series of wars between Gorontalo and Limboto seems to have led to al-
ternating episodes of violent intervention by Ternate and its greatest In-
donesian rival, Makassar.32 The Dutch-Ternaten expedition to Gorontalo 
in 1647 was also prompted by a local appeal, this time from one of the 
parties in an internal conflict within the Gorontalo royal family.33 
 In the third quarter of the seventeenth century, the number of foreign 
players in the North Sulawesi power game suddenly began to decline. In 
1660 the Spanish were chased out of Minahasa for the last time, and 
three years later the threat of an attack on Manila by the Chinese warlord 
Koxinga led them to withdraw their forces from Maluku, leaving Siau as 
the only remaining Spanish post in the area.34 In 1667 Makassar, which 
had gradually extended its power along the whole north coast and even 
out into the Sangir islands, was conquered by the Dutch and forced to re-
linquish all its claims in North Sulawesi.35 This left the VOC–Ternaten 
alliance in a position of unprecedented power. The Company, however, 
                                                      
30Tiele & Heeres 1886–1895 I: 352; van Dijk 1862: 274; Jacobs 1974–1984 III: 
312; Hustaart 1656: 53. 
31Dagh-Register 1643–1644: 116–119. 
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34Godée Molsbergen 1928: 18; Andaya 1993: 155. 
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was now the dominant half of this alliance, and when Governor Padt-
brugge decided to bring the whole of North Sulawesi under direct Dutch 
control in 1677, the malleable and unpopular young sultan Kaicili Sibori 
did nothing to oppose him. 
 The establishment of uncontested Dutch control in North Sulawesi 
ushered in a period of relative peace—or at least, one in which local 
conflicts carried less risk of escalation. Nevertheless, there were many in 
the region who would gladly have seen the old politics of competitive 
intervention continued. Gorontalo, after willingly exchanging Ternaten 
for Company suzerainty in 1678, quickly fell out with the Dutch when 
they attempted to limit its military power in the Gulf of Tomini.36 As 
prisoner on board a Dutch ship in 1681, a Gorontalo ruler vainly threat-
ened his captors with a return to the Ternaten fold.37 The raja of Manado, 
Loloda, had been increasingly at odds with the Dutch since 1656, when 
they built a stronghold near his capital and began to usurp his authority 
in Minahasa just as the Spaniards had done.38 After the VOC went so far 
as to conclude a treaty with the Minahasan chiefs over his head in 
January 1679, he joined in the rebellion against the Dutch launched at 
last by Kaicili Sibori of Ternate a few months later.39 In 1681, however, 
the Company captured Sibori and put Loloda to flight.40 In 1689 the 
latter made a vain attempt to seek support from an English trading 
expedition in Mindanao.41 In the same year, a delegation from Siau 
arrived in the Philippines with a last plea for liberation from “Dutch 
tyranny”; a Spanish chronicler remarked that it was “easier to offer them 
sympathy for their Christian misery than to remedy it.”42 
The Economic Contest 
The political and military contest for North Sulawesi, once begun, had its 
own internal dynamic. It was also underpinned, however, by the eco-
nomic value of the region to the contenders. Commercial relations be-
                                                      
36Heeres & Stapel 1907–1955 III: 127–136; van der Aa 1867: 150–154. 
37Dagh-Register 1681: 375. 
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42Murillo Velarde 1749: 358–359. 
A SUPERABUNDANCE OF CENTERS { PAGE } 
tween North Sulawesi and Ternate, for instance, were very old. Tomé 
Pires, writing soon after the first Portuguese ships reached Maluku in 
1512, recorded that gold was already being brought to Ternate by traders 
from Siau.43 The Spaniard Andres de Urdaneta, who lived in North 
Maluku from 1526 to 1535, wrote that the “Celebes”—meaning North 
Sulawesi, the Gulf of Tomini coast or the Sangir archipelago, since he 
deals separately with the other parts of Sulawesi and with Mindanao—
sent gold to Maluku every year and were also suppliers of sandalwood.44 
Portuguese information from the same period adds turtleshell and wax to 
the list of products reaching Ternate from the Celebes, and mentions that 
these goods were exchanged there for Indian cloth.45 
 These Hispanic sources portray the early North Sulawesi–Ternate 
trade as a matter of purely commercial exchange. Given the nature of the 
exchange, however—products of the land for exotic imported manufac-
tures—and given the politically and culturally “embedded” character of 
such trade in better-documented parts of traditional Indonesia, it seems 
likely that, in reality, rather more than pure economics was involved. 
Andaya describes just this kind of exchange, elaborated into public 
ceremony, as central to the original nature of lord–vassal relationships in 
North Maluku.46 Within North Sulawesi itself, the local raja certainly 
continued to distribute imported goods in return for tribute in local prod-
ucts until well into the nineteenth century.47 We may surmise, then, that 
the annual trading expeditions from North Sulawesi to Ternate in the 
early sixteenth century were already perceived—albeit perhaps more 
clearly by the people of Ternate than by those of Sulawesi—in terms of 
homage and tribute. 
 Such a system, however, could only remain free from tension while 
there was only one available source of the desired import goods. In some 
other parts of the Malukan periphery, notably the East Halmaheran and 
Papuan tributaries of Tidore, approximately this situation did prevail 
until a late date.48 European and other foreign traders did not generally 
sail beyond Halmahera, so the center retained its natural monopoly on 
                                                      
43Cortesão 1944: 221–222. 
44Navarrete 1825–1837 V: 437. 
45Tiele 1877–1886 II: 39. 
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47Van Delden 1844: 23; Steller 1866: 37; Wilken & Schwarz 1867: 296, 375. 
48Andaya 1993: 99–110. 
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the exchange goods that they brought. North Sulawesi, by contrast, and 
thanks in the first place to its greater accessibility, quickly became a 
competitive market in which distribution monopolies could be main-
tained only by force. 
 Until the middle of the seventeenth century, North Sulawesi did not 
itself produce the precious spices which were the main object of foreign 
voyages to eastern Indonesia.49 But because of its position astride two 
important early routes to the spice islands proper—from China and Lu-
zon via Mindanao and from Malacca via Brunei and North Borneo—it 
was visited by foreign vessels even before the arrival of the Europeans. 
The northern tip of Minahasa is mentioned in a Chinese source from the 
fourteenth century, and if Cortesão is right in his interpretation of a topo-
nym in the Suma Oriental, Manado had some direct trade with Malacca 
at the beginning of the sixteenth.50 The first Europeans known to have 
traded in the area were the crew of a Spanish vessel that took on supplies 
on Talaud in 1528—although two years earlier, a number of Spaniards 
had become trade items themselves when they were enslaved by the local 
population after a shipwreck on Greater Sangir.51 
 Sporadic European commercial contacts with North Sulawesi con-
tinued throughout the sixteenth century. In 1563, for instance, it was re-
ported that Portuguese cannon had found their way to Tolitoli on the 
northwestern corner of the peninsula.52 In this light, Sultan Hairun’s 
military expedition of the same year can be interpreted as a defensive 
reaction to Portuguese interference in a trade network previously focused 
upon Ternate. The real contest for economic domination in North Sula-
wesi, however, began with the establishment of Dutch and Spanish forts 
in North Maluku at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 
 The garrisons of these forts regularly had problems obtaining local 
food supplies, and both the Dutch and the Spanish saw the fertile rice-
fields of Minahasa, across the Maluku Sea to the west, as a potential 
solution. The first VOC ship loaded rice at Manado in 1608, and by 1614 
the Spanish, for whom this area was particularly attractive because of its 
proximity to Siau and the Philippine supply route, were doing so too.53 
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Coconut oil was another commodity soon being imported from North 
Sulawesi by the European outposts in Maluku.54 Later the VOC also 
developed an interest in a wider variety of North Sulawesi products, 
including damar and ebony as well as those which had been the mainstay 
of traditional exchange with Ternate—gold, turtleshell, and wax. Despite 
its alliance with Ternate, the Company purchased its goods directly from 
producers or collectors in Sulawesi, without Ternaten involvement. 
Finally, both the Spanish and the Dutch joined wholeheartedly in the 
contest for a typically Southeast Asian form of wealth that North Sula-
wesi also offered—human beings, to be bought or abducted as slaves.55 
 As a result of all this competition, the long-distance trade goods that 
were in demand in North Sulawesi—most importantly luxury textiles and 
European firearms—became widely available in North Sulawesi through 
several different channels. Ternate now had nothing unique to offer by 
way of economic patronage, and so its continuing demands for tribute in 
gold, slaves, wax and oil became correspondingly more difficult to 
enforce.56 In the rare surviving text of a letter written to the Spanish 
governor in Maluku in 1616 by the ruler of Kaidipan, one of the small 
polities on the north coast of North Sulawesi, the raja asks for muskets, 
ammunition, a flag, and some Indian cloth in return for his loyalty and 
provisions from his land.57 At this stage, then, the kind of economic 
complementarity that might have underpinned a traditional lord–vassal 
relationship still existed. But when the sultan of Ternate visited 
Tagulandang and Siau in 1675, his “vassals” were now in a position to 
include foreign manufactures in their gifts to him—gongs, porcelain, a 
musket, and a small cannon.58 Any economic basis for a stable political 
relationship had disappeared. 
The Cultural Contest 
Closely connected with the contest for political and economic control of 
North Sulawesi was a struggle for cultural hegemony. Most obviously 
this meant a contest for converts between Islam and Christianity, the 
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former promoted by Ternate and Makassar, the latter by the Portuguese 
and Spaniards and—to a lesser extent—by the Dutch. 
 Some Philippine historians have argued that, in the case of Mindanao, 
Ternaten authority in the seventeenth century actually rested upon an 
Islamic foundation. In this view, the Magindanao sultanate aligned itself 
with Ternate and not with the Christian Spanish because, thanks partly to 
Ternaten religious teachers, it was a Muslim country.59 At first glance, 
there is some reason to take religion almost as seriously as a factor in the 
contest for North Sulawesi. Long before the definitive Dutch takeover, it 
was customary that, while Muslims defeated or captured in Sulawesi by 
the Dutch–Ternaten alliance belonged to the sultanate, any baptized 
Christians became subjects of the Company.60 Nor was there any lack of 
what appeared to be religious violence. Tagulandang Muslims, for 
example, martyred three Franciscan missionaries in two separate 
incidents during the early seventeenth century, and Minahasan pagans 
killed a fourth.61 
 On close inspection, however, religious affiliation in North Sulawesi 
at this period is almost always open to interpretation as a function rather 
than a determinant of political allegiance. Tagulandang, for instance, was 
an established enemy of Siau and its Spanish protectors, and therefore 
also of their faith and its missionaries. When a Catholic group on the 
west coast of Sangir offered to submit to the VOC in 1614, but at the 
same time refused to accept Ternaten control for ostensibly religious rea-
sons, the Dutch noted that its local enemies on the east coast happened to 
be Muslims and vassals of Ternate.62 In the previous year the same group 
had apparently appealed to Muslim Makassar for support against 
Ternaten Tagulandang.63 
 As a rule, each change of patron also meant a change of formal relig-
ion. Manado, if we take the relevant European sources at face value, was 
Christianized, Islamized, Christianized and Islamized again in the period 
from 1563 to 1644.64 The people of Tagulandang, Muslim fanatics in 
early seventeenth-century accounts, went over quietly to the Dutch Re-
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formed Church after their transfer from Ternaten to VOC protection. By 
the end of the century, Tagulandang was said to consist “entirely of 
Christians.”65 Needless to say, doctrinal differences seldom played a role 
in such conversions. In 1675 a Dutch officer watched the sultan of 
Ternate “convert” a Sangirese king from Catholicism to Islam by placing 
a turban on his head.66 Two years later, it was the turn of the Dutch to 
distribute the headgear when chiefs from Tabukan exchanged their tur-
bans for European hats to mark their passage from Ternaten to Company 
overlordship and at the same time from Islam to Christianity.67 
 The modern reader is tempted to conclude from such evidence that 
formal religion, like clothing, was simply a badge or symbol of political 
affiliation. A seventeenth-century Dutch writer, however, was closer to 
the mark when he gibed that “the hood makes here the monk, the baptism 
makes here the Christian.”68 Sign and signified were not fully dif-
ferentiated, dress and ritual were believed to have cosmic implications in 
themselves. The object of attempts to manipulate the cosmos by means 
of changes in ritual behavior, on the other hand, was usually very prac-
tical. A Sangir raja summed this up neatly in 1677 when he explained to 
the Dutch that “since he was not aware of any disturbance or deprivation 
in his villages, he did not think it necessary to change his religion.”69 
 While the established folk religions generally continued to deal with 
domestic realms such as agriculture, the world religions were associated 
mainly with external power politics. And just as indigenous religious 
practice was in large part a magical technology for ensuring good har-
vests, the symbols and rituals of Christianity or Islam were expected to 
ensure success in relations with the outside world. In practice this meant 
military power and association with a powerful patron, so that the choice 
of religion was usually a pragmatic affair. When a Sangirese ambassador 
to Manila in 1639 was asked why he and his people sought conversion to 
Christianity, he replied that he had “observed many times that the truest 
and most powerful god was that of the Christians, because of the many 
and famous battles which they had always won against the heretics and 
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Moors of these islands.”70 Because religion was expected above all to be 
efficacious, it remained inseparable from—but at the same time (at least 
in subjective terms) no simple expression of—politics. 
 The pragmatism and flexibility of cultural attitudes to power and 
authority in North Sulawesi, forged in a decentralized, headhunting soci-
ety and elaborated by the violent experiences of the seventeenth century, 
made it difficult for Ternate or any other power to establish any stable 
kind of political legitimacy in the region. While the indigenous cultures 
were all acutely sensitive to status and hierarchy, they were also quick to 
recognize achieved status of various kinds, including that acquired by 
violent means. This was particularly true in Minahasa, where keter or 
“strength” was a leading cultural ideal.71 Once the VOC had proved its 
strength by establishing itself as the uncontested master of Manado, 
Minahasans were prepared to credit it with the same oracular powers and 
the same right to dispense judgements and honorific titles that they must 
previously have accorded to the indigenous Manado raja.72 Both inside 
and outside Minahasa, indigenous translators in Dutch and Spanish 
service also used the power derived from their nontraditional office to 
acquire considerable local prestige.73 
 This was, then, a competitive environment in which power constantly 
had to be demonstrated and could not be sustained by cultural means 
alone. It is interesting that only in Gorontalo, perhaps the most internally 
stable and hierarchically structured society in precolonial North Sula-
wesi, did a memory of Ternaten supremacy apparently outlive the end of 
Ternaten power in the region. In the nineteenth century, Ternate was re-
membered in Gorontalo as a former “older brother” of the local kingdom, 
and the Gorontalo raja still possessed a Ternaten shield among the royal 
regalia.74 In the more fluid societies further east, the Ternaten sultans 
seem to have figured in later oral tradition only as friends or rivals—in 
other words, as equals.75 
 There is, nevertheless, evidence that Ternate did indeed enjoy a kind 
of limited cultural hegemony throughout North Sulawesi during the hey-
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day of its political power. “Christian” as well as “Islamic” areas, for in-
stance, borrowed from the Ternaten sultanate a range of titles for various 
kinds of leader or dignitary—bobato, hukum, jogugu, kapita laut, ki-
malaha, marsaoli, sangaji—and retained them long after the end of Ter-
naten political involvement in the region.76 On the other hand, van 
Fraassen is undoubtedly right in suggesting that the survival of these 
terms into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was due at least in part 
to their continued official use by the Dutch, to whom they were more 
familiar than the various local terminologies.77 Certainly the old local 
titles usually survived alongside the imported nomenclature. 
 More importantly, indigenous power structures do not seem to have 
been affected in any concrete way by this terminological borrowing. In 
North Sulawesi, the Ternaten names were applied to existing functions 
quite different from those of their apparent prototypes. In Ternate, for 
instance, the hukum were two very senior representatives of the sultan; in 
Minahasa, a multitude of tribal chiefs.78 In Ternate, marsaoli referred to a 
descent group of which the head normally functioned as jogugu or first 
minister to the sultan; in Gorontalo, the four marsaoli were the heads of 
four separate descent groups, and none of them could become a jogugu.79 
Interestingly, the adoption of Ternaten titles in Gorontalo seems to have 
been almost simultaneous with the rejection of Ternaten overlordship in 
favor of that of the Company.80 This raises the possibility that besides 
being superficial, the imitation of Ternaten customs was intended here 
not as an act of submission but as a claim to equality and a gesture of 
defiance. Minahasan cultural imitation of the Dutch in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries was certainly to involve such a competitive 
dimension. 
 A final point under this cultural rubric concerns a recent suggestion 
by Andaya that the weakness of Ternaten control in North Sulawesi can 
partly be explained by the absence there of a mythological foundation for 
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strong links with North Maluku.81 In particular, Andaya notes, North 
Sulawesi did not figure in the politically important Bikusagara myth, in 
which the first rulers of Loloda, Bacan, Butung, Banggai, and the Papuas 
emerged from the same cluster of naga eggs.82 In other words, it was 
excluded from the mythically defined “world of Maluku” of which the 
western part was regarded as belonging to Ternate and the eastern to 
Tidore. 
 The Sangir islands, Bolaang-Mongondow, and Gorontalo do seem to 
lack origin myths involving Maluku, and this absence is particularly 
striking in the case of Gorontalo, where another foreign group, the Bugis 
of Luwu, are indeed credited with a key role in the foundation of the lo-
cal kingdom.83 In Manado, however, a tradition persisted even in the 
nineteenth century that the first Manadonese had been an exiled raja of 
Bacan and his followers.84 A recent Minahasan author also relates a 
similar story linking Manado with the kingdom of Loloda.85 Bacan and 
Loloda, of course, not only belong to the five traditional “core” king-
doms of Maluku, but also figure in the Bikusagara myth itself. The Ma-
nadonese, moreover, seem to have been the most important warriors and 
traders in North Sulawesi during the sixteenth century, though they were 
completely displaced by the Dutch in the seventeenth. Clearly, then, 
mythical “raw materials” with the potential to help legitimate a stable 
relationship with Ternate did in fact exist in North Sulawesi, as in other 
parts of the Malukan periphery. Political and economic developments, 
however, prevented them from playing that role. 
Epilogue 
The transfer of North Sulawesi to Dutch control after 1677 did not mean 
the end of all contact with Ternate. The newly acquired territories re-
mained part of the Malukan governorship of the VOC, itself based on 
Ternate and later to be known as the residency of Ternate. The Dutch 
even continued to deploy their own Ternaten personnel throughout the 
residency. In North Sulawesi, however, this practice often led to con-
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tinued friction between the Ternatens and the indigenous popluation. In 
1777, for instance, Ternaten korakora crews were placed in Minahasa to 
help protect its coasts against attacks by Magindanao slave raiders.86 
Their presence there was resented by many of the local people, who were 
obliged to provide for their maintenance.87 Troops from Ternate were 
also used from time to time for unpopular internal security duties in Mi-
nahasa, and in 1809 they formed the bulk of the Dutch forces that 
crushed a major rebellion at Tondano.88 In 1817 it was reported that, out 
of antipathy to Ternate, local rulers from North Sulawesi preferred to 
travel to Ambon for their formal Dutch investiture rather than to more 
accessible North Maluku.89 Few outside Ternate itself, then, will have 
had any regrets when, on a visit to Manado in 1824, Governor General 
van der Capellen decided to detach North Sulawesi from the Ternate 
administration and make it a separate residency in its own right.90 
 This decision was related to changing economic circumstances. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the main economic function of North 
Sulawesi as far as the Company was concerned had remained the supply 
of rice for local use and distribution in Ternate.91 By 1824, however, this 
regional trade was being overshadowed by the export of Minahasan 
coffee for the international market. Introduced in 1796, coffee cultivation 
flourished in Minahasa and was placed under state control in 1822.92 By 
the middle of the nineteenth century, it had put North Sulawesi far ahead 
of North Maluku in economic and political importance. In the wake of 
government coffee cultivation came Protestant missionaries who pro-
vided Minahasa with the best school system in nineteenth-century In-
donesia, and thereby triggered a wave of emigration among literate 
young men in search of white-collar work elsewhere in the archipelago.93 
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Before long, Ternate too had been colonized, ironically, by Minahasan 
teachers and civil servants.94 
 In the end, the only field in which Ternate left a lasting—though 
largely unrecognized—legacy in North Sulawesi was that of language. 
The modern lingua franca of North and Central Sulawesi, Manado Ma-
lay, is a variant of the Malay dialect spoken in North Maluku and con-
tains a great many words of Ternaten origin.95 Exactly when it became 
established in North Sulawesi is not known. It may already have been 
developing in the period of Ternaten political power, or it may have 
evolved subsequently in Manado and other VOC outposts, with their 
polyglot and partly Malukan populations. Through Manado Malay—and 
in some cases perhaps also directly—Ternaten loanwords entered various 
indigenous languages of North Sulawesi too.96 One result was that, more 
than two centuries after Minahasa renounced Ternaten and all other 
indigenous “royal” authority, Minahasan folktales still featured “kings” 
referred to not by the local term datu or the Indic raja, but as kolano, a 
title once borne by the sultans of Ternate.97 
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